The Titan Submersible Hearings End With Few Solid Answers. Here’s What Comes Next

Another surprising omission was during Thursday’s testimony of Mark Negley, a Boeing engineer. Negley had carried out a preliminary design study for the Titan, and assisted OceanGate with testing equipment and advice for nearly a decade. He testified to the challenges of building carbon fiber structures.

The panel did not ask Negley about an email he sent Rush in 2018 sharing an analysis based on information Rush had provided. “We think you are at a high risk of a significant failure at or before you reach 4,000 meters,” he wrote. The email included a chart showing a skull and crossbones at around that depth.

Many Red Flags, Few Solid Answers

This week also saw technical testimony from other expert witnesses about the design and classification of submersibles. All were skeptical, or outright critical, of OceanGate’s decision to operate Titan using a novel carbon fiber hull with little testing, and relying on an unproven acoustic monitoring system for live information on the hull’s integrity.

“Instantaneous delamination and collapse can occur in less than a millisecond,” testified Roy Thomas from the American Bureau of Shipping. “Real-time monitoring could not capture this.”

Donald Kramer, a materials engineer at the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB), testified to there being manufacturing defects in the composite hull. He described the Titan’s wreckage as having peeled into layers of carbon fiber that matched its multi-stage construction, but would not offer an opinion on what might have caused the implosion.

Neither the manufacturers of the hull nor OceanGate’s engineering director at the time of its construction were called to testify.

MBI chair Jason Neubauer said at a press conference after the hearings: “We do not have to obtain testimony from every witness. As long as we get factual information and data, from the company, through forensics, and from other witnesses, it’s possible we don’t interview every witness that has been identified.”

Kramer noted that data from 2022, when an explosive bang was heard after the Titan surfaced after a dive to the Titanic, showed a worrying shift in strain in the hull. OceanGate’s then director of engineering, Phil Brooks, testified that he was probably not qualified to analyze that data, and that Rush personally cleared the submersible for its final dives.

Over the last two weeks, multiple witnesses had testified to Rush’s primary role in driving business, engineering, and operational decisions and to his abrasive personality and temper. Matthew McCoy, a technician at OceanGate in 2017 and a former Coast Guard officer, testified today about a conversation he had with Rush about getting the Titan registered and inspected.

McCoy recalled that Rush said that if the Coast Guard became a problem, he would “buy a Congressman and the problem would go away.” McCoy handed in his notice the following day.

What Happens Next

With the conclusion of the public hearings, the Coast Guard’s MBI will now start preparing its final report. That could include a definitive cause of the fatal accident, referrals for criminal investigations, and recommendations for future policy and regulations.

The Titan’s hull and viewport featured prominently in expert testimony about potential physical causes of the implosion. Regardless of which component ultimately failed, witnesses have leveled criticism at everyone from designers and manufacturers to OceanGate’s operational team and executive decision-making. This might make it difficult to ever fix on a single cause or to single out individuals who were to blame, with the exception of Stockton Rush.